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The conventional wisdom in the literature on aid allocation suggests that donors uti-
lize bilateral aid as a tool to buy influence in the aid-receiving country. Those who
conclude that aid is driven by donor self-interest focus on government-to-government
aid transfers. However, this approach overlooks important variation in delivery tac-
tics: bilateral donors frequently provide aid to non-state actors. This paper argues
that donors resort to delivery tactics that increase the likelihood of aid achieving its
intended outcome. In poorly governed recipient countries, donors bypass recipient gov-
ernments and deliver more aid through non-state actors, all else equal. In recipient
countries with higher governance quality, donors engage the government and give more
aid through the government-to-government channel. Using OLS and Probit regres-
sions, I find empirical support for this argument. Understanding the determinants of
donor delivery tactics has important implications for assessing aid effectiveness.
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Introduction
In 2008, Haiti, a developing country with an abysmal record of governance, received
more than 700 million US dollars in bilateral development assistance from OECD donor
countries, amounting to roughly 70 dollars of aid per capita. In the same year, Tan-
zania, whose institutions of intermediate strength bode well for effective aid imple-
mentation, received around 2 billion US dollars in bilateral assistance, equivalent to
approximately 47 dollars in per capita aid. For recent accounts of aid policy by schol-
ars who champion a rational and selfish donor government over one that derives utility
from aid effectiveness this outcome is consistent with an empirical regularity: in spite
of a high probability of aid waste donors continue to provide high volumes of per capita
aid to countries with poor governance. This regularity, coupled with the assumption
that aid directly adds to a government’s available resources has prompted scholars to
question donors’ development motivations (e.g. Alesina and Weder 2002; Bueno de
Mesquita and Smith 2009; Neumayer 2003).
However, this image of the selfish donor government changes when one accounts
for the mechanism of aid delivery: Over sixty percent of aid to Haiti bypassed the
central government and is channeled through international and local non-governmental
organizations, multilateral organizations, and private contractors. In Tanzania, on the
other hand, only 15 percent of the aid to Tanzania is channeled through non-state
actors. The balance was given to the Tanzanian government in a bilateral, state-
to-state engagement (OECD 2010). The central focus of this paper addresses this
empirical puzzle: why do OECD donors choose to bypass state institutions in some
developing countries but not others? And, under what conditions do they do so?
This study argues that donor decisions about the selection of delivery mechanisms
are not random but endogenous to the quality of recipient state institutions. Outcome-
oriented donors, who seek to maximize the impact of their aid on recipient development,
respond tactically to the quality of governance in the recipient country. Recipient in-
stitutions serve as a credible signal for gauging the probability of successful aid imple-
mentation. Strong institutions signal greater capacity and willingness of the recipient
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government to effectively disburse aid, thus encouraging donors to entrust the govern-
ment with more of the aid. At the same time, bad governance raises the specter of aid
misuse and creates an incentive for donors to seek out alternative development partners
that allow them to protect a larger share of their aid from capture by the recipient
government.
The results of this paper are important for understanding aid policy. At a funda-
mental level, the analysis of donor delivery decisions enhances our understanding of the
complex nature of real-world donor decision-making where mechanisms of aid provi-
sion assume a crucial role. As a senior French government official suggested during an
interview: “Fifty percent, if not more, of total annual ODA-aid effort, meaning more
than half of one hundred billion Euros, is about delivering the aid to the beneficiary
in the recipient country. It’s about selecting the right interface, the right channels of
delivery. And this estimate is a conservative one.”1
Understanding what these delivery tools and tactics are and why donors resort to
them has the potential to shed light on donors’ development orientation. While the
examples from Haiti and Tanzania suggests that donors provide aid through chan-
nels other than recipient government, this study uses new OECD project-level data
on foreign aid delivery channels to show that donors exhibit tactical awareness by sys-
tematically conditioning their delivery choices on the likelihood of aid success in the
recipient country. Importantly, the analysis of aid delivery decisions not only informs
our understanding of aid policy but also carries important implications for the study of
aid effectiveness. The conventional framework for assessing development-effectiveness
focuses on conditions within the recipient country, assuming all aid is equally fungi-
ble. By design, however, bypass tactics already incorporate information about the
quality of recipient governance in the aid-receiving country, thus shielding valuable
resources from waste by corrupt governments and weak state institutions as they enter
the aid-receiving country. Conventional aid effectiveness frameworks, therefore, may
underestimate donor ability to enforce development contracts and overestimate the
influence of recipient country characteristics on the success of aid.
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Previous Literature on Aid Allocation
Numerous studies explore bilateral aid policy by assessing OECD donors’ aid com-
mitments. Guided by analytical models and rigorous empirical studies many stud-
ies explain aid levels on the basis of recipient characteristics. The common focus
of this research has overwhelmingly been on government-to-government aid transfers;
and there are many good reasons for this analytical decision. Historically, foreign
aid transfers have been predominantly government-to-government, starting with large-
scale U.S. reconstruction efforts under the Marshall Plan. More recently, donor rhetoric
on capacity-building emphasizes the role of government-to-government aid in helping
recipient governments move towards sustainable development (e.g. OECD Paris Dec-
laration). However, empirical evidence shows that OECD donors channel significant
amounts of bilateral assistance around recipient governments and through non-state
development actors: in 2008, OECD donors committed a total of US$ 112 billion and
delegated over 30 percent of the aid, approximately US$ 41 billion, for implementation
through non-state development actors, which include NGOs, multilaterals, and private
contractors (OECD 2010). These non-state actors are hired for specific project delivery
and remain accountable to the donors.2
Many studies of aid policy that assume bilateral aid flows are government-to-
government have contributed to the emergence of a conventional wisdom suggesting
that donor allocation behavior is not driven by aid effectiveness concerns. For instance,
Alesina and Weder (2002) assess the extent to which donors condition their aid com-
mitments on state institutions in the aid-receiving country based on the understanding
that a good institutional environment provides a fertile ground for the effective imple-
mentation of aid projects. They show evidence that more corrupt governments receive
more aid. Neumayer (2003), Stone (2006), and Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007,
2009) find that recipient governance has limited importance for shaping bilateral aid
commitments.
The basso continuo of this literature is that donors are not actively pursuing effec-
tive development strategies. Rather, this line of inquiry emphasizes the role of bilateral
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foreign aid as a primary instrument of state-craft, used to gain influence over recipient
governments to advance donor goals. These donor goals can include recipient govern-
ment stability (e.g. Kono and Montinolla 2009), counter-terrorism (e.g. Bapat 2011;
Boutton and Carter 2011), access to natural resources (e.g. Kapfer et al 2007), and
democratization (e.g. Bermeo 2009; Wright 2009). According to Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith (2009) it would be mere coincidence if bilateral aid would substantially
contribute to recipient development:
“Recipient and donor leaders seek substantive policies and resource allo-
cations that protect their hold on power. To the extent that such poli-
cies and allocations are compatible with good economic or social perfor-
mance, they will make social-welfare enhancing, “good decisions.” Yet, such
instances are coincidental. If faced with a contradiction between actions
that enhance their own political welfare and actions that advance societal
well-being, donor and recipient leaders will select those policies that benefit
themselves.” (p. 312)
Models of a rational, self-serving donor government in the study of foreign aid
allocation rest on the supposition that donors derive utility mainly from advancing the
interests of their political elites and that they seek to maximize this utility by choosing
the level of aid support to the recipient government. They assume that each aid
dollar is equally fungible and can be spent at the discretion of recipient governments.
However, if donor governments used aid solely to obtain policy concessions by recipient
governments or further other selfish goals, the use of bypass tactics is puzzling. By
definition, bypass reduces the amount of available funds for striking non-developmental
bargains with the recipient government.
The fact that donors use multiple bilateral aid delivery tactics may thus serve
as prima facie evidence that donors derive more utility from aid success than the
conventional wisdom would want us to believe. What is more, donor rhetoric over
the last decade emphasizes the focus on poverty reduction as an end in itself, as well
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as means to combat security threats in the developing world. With the Millennium
Development Goals serving as an explicit road map to achieve success therein (Mosse
2005; Renard 2006).3 In either case, whether the pursuit of recipient development is
based on pure altruism or a selfish calculus, this study attempts to answer the question
about whether donors allocate aid by employing tactics that increase the likelihood of
achieving the desired outcome. Do OECD donors systematically condition aid delivery
decisions on the quality of recipient institutions?
Radelet (2004) explicitly recognizes the heterogeneity of aid delivery tools in bi-
lateral aid allocation and the importance of donor decisions about how to deliver the
aid for reaching the Millennium Development Goals. He advocates that“aid should be
delivered to countries with better governance very differently than to countries with
poor governance. To date, the move towards greater country selectivity has been con-
ceived primarily as allocating more Official Development Assistance to countries with
better policies and stronger institutions. However, the idea that aid is likely to be
more effective in well-governed countries should influence more than just the amount
of aid that donors provide -it should change the way that donors administer aid” (p.12).
Recent empirical work by Winters (2010a) enriches our insights about the calculus of
a development-oriented World Bank by leveraging heterogeneity of lending tools. He
shows that the World Bank differentiates systematically among lending tools with a
view towards effective aid implementation. Like previous studies Winters focuses on
government-to-government aid flows.
This study provides an original line of inquiry by analyzing whether OECD donor
governments condition decisions to channel funds through non-state development ac-
tors when state institutions present a problem for effective aid delivery. Through
bypass tactics, development-oriented donors have a third-party mechanism that goes
beyond the conventional government-to-government mode of delivery, thus altering the
structure of aid provision. My answer to this research question has the potential to
shed light on the development calculus of donor governments and carries implications
for the study of aid effectiveness.
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The Influence of Governance on Aid Delivery
Why do donor governments pursue a development strategy that delegates valuable
bilateral aid resources to third-party development actors instead of channeling them
through recipient governments? The risk of aid capture, coupled with a donor calculus
that derives utility from development, offers a potential answer.4
Each year donors give development assistance to developing countries, many of
which exhibit unproductive situations in which aid goes to waste through government
incentives to pocket the aid for personal gain and/or limited capacity on the part of
state institutions to ensure that aid reaches its intended beneficiaries. As analytical
and empirical work on donors’ aid implementation record shows, aid transfers be-
tween donor and recipient governments are at great risk of aid capture through agency
problems and bureaucratic inefficiencies in poorly governed countries (Brautigam and
Knack 2004; Djankov et al 2008; Gibson et al 2005; Reinikka and Svensson 2004, Svens-
son 2000). In these countries institutions fail to provide minimal levels of corruption
control, rule of law, government effectiveness, and regulatory quality.5
In countries with better governance, the threat of aid capture is lower because
more effective institutions provide rules and constraints that limit exploitative elite
behavior and bolster administrative capacity (e.g. North 1990, 1991). What is more,
governments with indigenous development capacity may (1) have better knowledge
than the donor about what type of outside intervention is needed and (2) make aid
implementation more cost-effective. The positive effects of engaging with recipient
governments in situations where they represent trustworthy implementation partners
has been discussed in the theoretical literature (e.g. Hefeker and Michaelowa 2005;
Svensson 2000). If governance does not pose a problem, therefore, donors will prefer
to deliver aid through the government-to-government channel, all else equal.6
When making allocation decisions, donors therefore turn to the quality of gover-
nance in recipient countries for credible signals about the extent to which foreign aid is
threatened by aid capture. They assess governance quality through publicly available
data on governance ratings as well as more detailed field reports provided through local
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implementation partners.7
From this perspective, the central issue in aid allocation is not how much aid donors
provide but rather how it can be delivered so that it mitigates institutional failure and
ensures efficacy of aid output in places like Haiti, Sudan, or Zimbabwe where need is
high, yet existing governance deficiencies pose severe risks to effective aid implemen-
tation? In light of the negative effects of aid capture on aid outcomes, scholars and
practitioners have suggested that donors reduce the risk of aid capture by pursuing a
strategy of country selectivity, i.e. targeting countries with higher levels of governance
where the probability of aid capture is low. And while country selectivity makes sense
on its face, it also implies that the countries which need the aid most get very little.
Scholars like Collier (2003) and Radelet (2004) make this short-coming explicit in their
writing. Easterly et al (2003), too, suggest that country selectivity may not be the
appropriate path to help the world’s poorest countries develop. But there does not
seem to be a general consensus about what other criteria they should use.
Among practitioners, there is a growing consensus on the need to maintain sustained
engagement in the worlds’ poorest and often most fragile states. A senior British DfID
government official makes this point vividly: “It is important to move away from the
Washington consensus, which stresses development cooperation with reforming states
so that they get even better. The consensus implies that we leave the Sudans and
Afghanistans behind because they are too difficult. Somewhere in the last five to ten
years there has been a paradigm shift with us donors acknowledging that we cannot
leave the tough spots. We need to deal with these countries and still take account
of state capacity but the premise must be that it is not there. We need to intervene
differently.”8
This popular demand for more effective aid policy also responds to pessimism
generated by scholarly assessments of the effectiveness of a common government-to-
government allocation tool: aid conditionality. Numerous analytical and empirical
accounts of interactions between donor and recipient governments argue that donors
lack the ability to credibly enforce aid contracts, in general, and attached reform con-
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ditions, in particular (e.g. Collier 1997; Mosley 1987; Stone 2004; Svensson 2003).
A key insight drawn from this literature must be that conventional government-to-
government aid contracts may not have sufficient bite to align recipient government
incentives in ways that ensure assistance reaches the intended beneficiaries.
By accounting for variation in aid delivery channels, I uncover an important mech-
anism of aid delivery: bypassing recipient governments. This allows donors to work
around the difficulties of enforcing aid contracts in situations where the probability of
aid capture is high. In making the argument about endogenous bypass tactics, it is
important to distinguish between government-to-government and bypass aid. I define
government-to-government aid as any aid activity that involves the recipient govern-
ment as an implementing partner.9 In contrast, I categorize aid delivered through
non-state development channels as that which does not engage government authorities
at all. There are four main types of non-state development actors: local/international
NGOs, multilateral organizations, private contractors and public-private partnerships.
Local NGOs are important development partners for donors. Their issue focus and
local knowledge about what types of projects are needed most make them attractive
to donors who seek to deliver services effectively. Examples of local/regional NGO
success stories in foreign aid delivery across the developing world include Love Live in
South Africa, The AIDS Support Organization in Uganda, and the Grameen Bank in
Bangladesh (see also Radelet 2004). Not all NGOs are equally virtuous and capable,
however. In poorly governed countries, NGOs may not necessarily be a viable alterna-
tive for better service delivery.10 To mitigate potential implementation problems of aid
delivered through local NGOs, donors resort to funding international NGOs such as
Oxfam, Doctors Without Borders or Care International. Like their local counterparts,
international NGOs are issue-focused and typically have better knowledge of local ca-
pacities than donor officials in donor countries. Given their increased knowledge of local
conditions and their dependence of funding on donor governments, international NGOs
may be in a better position than donor agency officials to select local implementation
partners that can help deliver aid more effectively than the recipient government.
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In regions of the world where viable NGO partners are not represented on the
ground, or where aid projects may require economy of development, donors can turn
to multilateral organizations for service delivery. Organizations like UNICEF, for in-
stance, have generated many aid success stories around the world. Like international
NGOs, many multilaterals are specialized and involved with the local sector. What dif-
ferentiates them from smaller NGOs is the size of their operations and their capacity to
quickly mount emergency response interventions as well as sustain more long-term ser-
vice delivery programs. Yet another important type of non-state development channel
is for-profit contracting. Donor governments often outsource development assistance
to the private sector by awarding contracts to private contracting firms, which are
hired for technical purposes, including consulting and direct hands-on assistance in the
implementation of aid activities.
While there is considerable variety among these bypass channels, they share two
main characteristics that justify my decision to subsume them all under the category
“bypass.” First, they all are independent development actors that provide donors with
the opportunity to channel their funds through actors other than the recipient govern-
ment. Second, the primary mission of these non-state entities is poverty alleviation.
Such an issue-focus implies that non-state development actors generate the majority of
their funding through poverty reduction projects (i.e. their promise of implementing
aid projects effectively), thus making their organizational survival more dependent on
their performance in this issue area. Recipient governments, on the other hand, have
multiple objectives and can often tap sources other than aid for the process of revenue-
generation, such as e.g. natural resources and investment. Also, given the multitude of
non-state development actors, donors can potentially punish bad implementation per-
formance by switching to another organization. In light of these characteristics, I claim
that “bypass” is a preferred donor tactic in countries with low levels of governance.
Specifically, donors view bypass aid as more insulated from aid capture. I thus advance
the following hypothesis: when the quality of governance is low, OECD donors bypass
recipient governments and channel a greater proportion of their aid through non-state
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development actors.
In offering this hypothesis it is important to clarify what I am not arguing. I do
not claim that donors expect bypass aid to be completely insulated from aid capture.
As evidence from officials with donor government suggests, donors are acutely aware
of potential implementation difficulties arising from delegating aid to non-state devel-
opment actors. However, as suggested above, non-state development actors largely
depend on donor funds for their survival -a fact, which should generate considerable
performance pressure on any organization and conceptually distinguishes the non-state
actor from the recipient government. In addition, several for-profit NGO rating agen-
cies exist (e.g. ForeignAID Ratings LLC) that provide donors with assessments about
the financial efficiency and institutional development of NGOs. I thus re-emphasize
the relative nature of my argument: donors will opt for bypass in poorly governed
countries because they expect bypass aid to have a greater likelihood of achieving the
desired outcome than government-to-government aid.
Research Design, Data and Measures
I explain donor decisions to bypass recipient governments across 22 OECD donor
countries. The universe of recipient countries includes ODA eligible countries as defined
by the OECD (including low, lower middle and upper middle income countries). I test
my argument at two levels of analysis. First, given the diversity of donors in my sample,
the main unit of analysis is the donor-recipient dyad year. Second, I test my argument
at the monadic recipient year level, taking into account my conjectures about average
bypass behavior. My temporal domain ranges from 2005 to 2009.11
The dependent variable: donor bypass
My empirical analysis asks: Does recipient governance explain donor decisions to
bypass government institutions? The outcome of interest therefore are donor decisions
to bypass government institutions. To construct a measure of bypass I use new data
drawn from the OECD CRS aid activity database. The OECD began collecting (donor
reported) information on the “channel of delivery” in 2004, when it became an optional
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reporting item on the new CRS++ reporting scheme. Information on the channel of
delivery conveys how foreign aid is delivered: it records the amount of bilateral aid flows
channeled through five channel categories. These include government-to-government
aid as well as aid delivered to non-governmental organizations, multilaterals, public-
private partnerships, and other development actors.
I operationalize the decision to bypass in two different ways: My main measure
of bypass is continuous and captures the proportion of aid delivered through non-
state development actors. When donors allocate funds to a particular country, what
proportion of the assistance goes to non-state actors? Table 1 presents the proportion
of non-state aid each donor country allocates across its recipient countries in 2008.
Sweden tops the list with 73 percent of its aid channeled through non-state actors,
followed by Finland and Spain. Italy pursues bypass tactics with nearly half of its
bilateral funds, soon followed by the United States, which outsources more than 30
percent of its bilateral funds. At the bottom of the bypass table are Portugal, France,
and Greece which send less than 10 percent of their aid through bypass channels.12
[Table 1]
Since reporting on the recently (2004) introduced data item “delivery channel” is
optional, available data are affected by underreporting (OECD CRS Reporting Direc-
tives Manual 2008).13 Before discussing my strategies to deal with underreporting it
is important to highlight that existing evaluations of donor reporting practices suggest
that underreporting is not a function of the nature of the channels of delivery. Rather,
shortcomings in reporting are the result of time lags in the adoption of new reporting
requirements coupled with lack of training of and resources for technical staff in aid
agencies, which exhibits variation across time and donors. According to reports by
Aidinfo (2008, p.16), a pro-transparency aid advocacy group, donors do not allocate
enough resources, technology, or professional skills for data management and reporting,
which is complicated by the fact that management requires the integration of multiple
implementation levels, e.g. field and country level systems.14
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To ensure the robustness of my estimations, I construct an alternative binary by-
pass measure, with “1” indicating that donors deliver aid exclusively through non-state
development partners. This may be any combination of international/local NGOs,
multilateral institutions, or public-private partnerships but it excludes government-to-
government aid. Zero, on the other hand, implies that donors engage the recipient
government directly, either in the context of mixed strategies (which allows for a com-
bination of state-to-state and non-state aid) or exclusive cooperation with the recipient
government. The simple coding of my binary outcome, bypass yes/no, considerably
reduces the potential for bias due to reporting problems. Since my bypass measure
is coded as “1” only when donors give 100 percent of their aid through bypass the
expected bias in reporting is unlikely to be the cause of either false positives or false
negatives, since the expected bias in reporting would be to not have information that
the aid was going through non-state channels. I limit the fraction of missing data per
recipient-dyad to be less than 20 percent.
In addition I augment missing data through multiple imputation techniques. Specif-
ically, I approach missing data analysis from a counterfactual perspective, building on
work by Frisina et al (2008). I ask: what would the aid shares looks like for any
donor-recipient dyad had the donor allocated 100 percent of the aid across the chan-
nels? To answer this question I reallocate unreported aid flows between government-
to-government and non-state aid. The extent to which the aid shares of both types
increase or decrease is a function of the imputation model, which imputes values for
the dependent variable at the level of the log-transformed non-state aid share. I follow
Amelia II imputation principles for the imputation (King et al 1999).15
The explanatory variable: quality of governance
At the heart of donor decisions about aid delivery are assessments about the likeli-
hood of aid reaching the intended outcome in the recipient country. If state institutions
are of poor quality, donors expect a higher probability of aid capture and consequently
increase the proportion of aid that bypasses governments. The main variable of in-
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terest, therefore, is Governance Quality. To capture the quality of governance I draw
on data from the Governance Matters project (Kaufman et al 2009).16 I select this
particular source of governance measures for two reasons: first, it provides excellent
cross-sectional coverage and is available up to 2009. Second, author interviews with
donor officials suggest that donor governments consult this publicly available gover-
nance source in their assessments, with a particular focus on economic institutions
such as corruption control, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and rule of
law.17
Drawing from six available indicators I construct two different governance measures:
Governance, All Inst is a measure at the highest level of aggregation, aggregating all
six governance dimensions. Governance, Ec. Inst is a measure which captures a state’s
economic institutions by including corruption control, government effectiveness, regu-
latory quality, and rule of law as indicators.18 The values of both governance measures
range between 0 to 5, with higher values representing a higher quality of governance.
To illustrate recent donor aid delivery decisions in situations were the quality of gover-
nance is abysmal and where the quality of aid capture is high, I plot donor development
cooperation in Sudan in 2008, which scores roughly 1 on the aggregate governance in-
dicator. Figure 1 shows the bypass behavior of all OECD donors in Sudan, across the
full range of possible bypass behavior (as captured along the x-axis). With the ex-
ception of Greece, all donor governments bypass the Sudanese government with more




As the previous literature on aid policy maintains, various other factors shape donor
decision about the allocation of aid resources, including other recipient characteristics
and non-developmental donor goals. I include them as controls to provide a fully
specified model. All time-varying right-hand side variables are lagged one year. I
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begin with the confounding effects of Democracy based on the understanding that
some donors may conceive of democratic institutions as political constraints that limit
the ability of recipient governments and bureaucratic officials to capture aid flows.
Democracy is measured using the combined score of the Freedom House (2009) civil
liberty and political rights indicators. To make the scale of the measure more intuitive
I invert Democracy so that “1” represents the lowest level of democracy, while “7”
stands for the highest level of democracy.19 I control for Natural Disasters based on
the understanding that a greater number of natural disasters in the aid recipient, as
recorded by the EM-DAT database, may prompt donors to provide a larger share of the
pie to non-state development actors that are specialized in post disaster reconstruction
efforts. Following a similar logic, low-scale Civil Conflict, as recorded by Gleditsch et
al’s (2002) PRIO database, may create grievances that provide incentives for donors to
favor more outcome-orientated aid delivery about ensuring that aid reaches the affected,
thus increasing donor propensity to bypass. I further include Distance to account for
the geographical proximity between donor and the aid-receiving countries. As distance
between donors and aid-receiving countries grows, government-to-government relations
between donor and recipient governments are expected to weaken, thus increasing donor
propensity to channel aid through non-state development actors. The distance data
are drawn from Bennett and Stam’s (2000) Eugene software and are logged.
Following previous studies, I also include confounders that capture donor non-
developmental objectives. Former Colony status, as recorded by the CIA World Fact-
book, allows me to account for long-lasting diplomatic ties between the donor and
the aid receiving governments that may bias aid delivery in favor of government-to-
government aid. Trade Intensity, measured as the logged sum of imports and ex-
ports between the recipient and the OECD countries by the IMF-DOT database, is a
straightforward indicator of donor efforts to strengthen economic ties with the recipient
government. To control for security related donor goals, I include Security Council,
which is a binary variable indicating whether the aid recipient is a rotating member
on the UN Security Council. As research by Kuziemko and Werker (2006) finds, donor
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governments use aid to buy votes from rotating members of the UN Security Council.
I also include Terrorism, which captures the number of terrorist attacks in the aid-
receiving country as recorded by the Global Terrorism Database. I use this measure
based on the understanding that donors have incentives to assist recipient governments
in their fight of terrorism (e.g. Bapat 2011, Button and Carter 2011).
To account for the confounding influence of donor ideology and economic conditions
on the propensity to bypass I include Donor Welfare, measured as social spending over
GDP by the OECD’s Social Expenditures Database, based on the understanding that
greater donor commitment to domestic redistribution may translate into more generous
aid giving (e.g. Noel and Therien 2000, Tingley 2010), yet may fail to generate pressure
on governments to ensure the aid gets delivered effectively. Finally, I control for Donor
Growth, recorded by the Penn World Tables, based on the understanding that as a
donor’s growth performance improves, the pressure on governments to maximize aid
success lightens, thus reducing the donor propensity to bypass recipient governments.
To deal with other factors that could systematically affect donor decisions to bypass
recipient governments I add a set of donor fixed effects as well as a set of regional fixed
effects.20 I also include a time trend variable to ensure that the observed relationship
between the quality of governance and bypass is not a function of the two variables
exhibiting a trend in either direction over time.
Analysis and Results
Before I proceed to the analysis of the data it is important to provide a brief dis-
cussion of the statistical implications of using a proportional outcome measure, which
requires compositional data analysis.21 For any donor-recipient dyad the aid channel
share is positive and the sum of the aid channels shares must be one hundred percent.
Consider the aid share A, in donor-recipient dyad i for channel j. The compositional
nature of the variable is expressed by the constraints that the fraction of the aid share
that government-to-government or non-state channels might receive is doubly bounded,
falling between 0 and 1,
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Ai,j ∈ [0, 1] ∀ i, j, (1)
with Ai,j denoting the fraction of the aid in donor-recipient dyad i (i=1, ..., N)
for delivery channel j (j=1, J). Government-to-government aid and non-state aid in a
given donor-recipient dyad sums to unity,
J∑
j=1
Aij = 1 ∀ i, j, (2)
where J is the total number of delivery channels, which equal 2 (government-to-
government and non-state aid) in my case.
Following Aitchison (1986), I create a (J − 1) log aid ratio, which compares the
non-state aid to government-to-government aid:
Yi1 = ln(Ai1/Ai2) = ln(Ai1/(1−Ai1) (3)
The advantage of log transforming proportional outcomes is that the outcome is
unconstrained, allowing for a straightforward estimation through OLS. The coefficient
of the log-transformed non-state share variable then describes how the log ratio of non-
state aid changes with respect to government-to-government aid. After modeling, the
estimates are transformed back into their original scale of interest:
Ai1 = (1 + e
−Yi1)
−1. (4)
and Y is log-transformed following the steps (1) through (4) above.
I now estimate my model using OLS regressions with robust standard errors clus-
tered on the recipient country. In order to investigate possible bias from serial corre-
lation, I apply the Wooldrige test for panel data (Wooldridge 2002, p. 282-283). The
insignificance of the test-statistic (p = 0.33) indicates that I cannot reject the null
hypothesis of “no first-order autocorrelation” and conclude that my findings are not
biased by temporal correlation of the errors. The following equation (1) delineates my
statistical model.
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Bypassit = β0 + β1QG+ β2Z + ϵit, (5)
where Bypass is the continuous log-transformed (OLS) variable (see equations 1
through 3), i represents country and t represents year, β0 is the intercept, β1 and
β2 represent the vectors of coefficients to be estimated, QG denotes the quality of
recipient governance as described in Section 4.3.1., Z denotes the vector of control
variables described in section 4.3.2., and ϵit is the error term of the equation.
[Table 2]
In Table 2, I present the central findings of the model. The first column presents
OLS results for a base model (Model 1) estimating the proportion of aid delivered
through non-state development actors, which includes the Governance, All Inst. mea-
sure and draws on data that are completely reported across delivery channels. The
second column offers OLS results for the fully specified model (Model 2), which fo-
cuses on the effect of economic institutions on donor delivery decisions as captured
by the Governance, Ec. Inst measure, controlling for Democracy, Civil Conflict, Ter-
rorism and all other confounding covariates. In the third column, I present Probit
results for my binary bypass measure (Model 3), modeling the probability of donor
decisions to exclusively deliver all aid through bypass channels. The sample size now
includes donor-recipient observations for which at least 80 percent of all transactions
are accounted for by delivery channels. On the basis of this slightly larger sample,
I re-estimate Model 2 and present the findings in the fourth column. Finally, the
fifth column presents results where the data of the continuous dependent variable was
augmented through multiple augmentation techniques.22
Across all models, the coefficients for the governance measures clearly stands out.
The coefficient is negative and highly significant when holding constant the effects of
confounding covariates. This result holds across differences in model specifications,
bypass measures, and degrees of missingness, thus providing robust empirical evidence
for my thesis: to the extent that governance is a problem for aid success, donors
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will delegate development cooperation to non-state development actors. The other
predictors of bypass that are most consistent in their statistical impact on bypass
across different model specifications influence the outcome variable in the predicted
direction: Civil Conflict and Distance increase donor decisions to bypass across the
majority of models, while Trade Intensity, Donor Welfare, and Donor Growth reduce
the amount of aid delegated to non-state development actors. The remaining controls,
Democracy, Natural Disasters, and Security Council behave in the predicted direction
but their statistical significance fluctuates across the models.
[Table 3]
Figure 2 highlights the substantive significance of recipient governance, as estimated
in Model 2 of Table 1 for donor bypass decisions using statistical simulation techniques
in Zelig (Imai et al 2007). The figure graphs the expected value of bypass across the
entire range of governance, surrounded by 90 percent confidence intervals. At low
levels of governance (around 1) -as observed 2008 in Sudan, Chad, or Haiti- the model
predicts donors to bypass with more than 90 percent of their aid. At the mean level
of governance (around 2.5) - as in El Salvador or Bolivia the expected value of bypass
is lower at approximately 0.45 percent. Finally, at a governance quality level of 3.5
-as observed in Chile and Micronesia in 2008- donors are expected to provide an even
smaller proportion of their aid flows through non-state development actors, with less
than 20 percent delegated aid.23
[Figure 2]
To ensure the robustness of my findings, which demonstrated the statistical and
substantive significance of recipient governance on donor propensity to use bypass tac-
tics, I perform a series of additional estimations. Since most economic and political
data are strongly related to their recent histories, readers might be concerned about
my decision to use time-series cross section analysis. To the extent that the sample now
includes up to five observations for any given donor-recipient dyad that may potentially
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offer very similar information across many of the right-hand side variables, the coeffi-
cient standard errors may be “artificially” deflated. I therefore re-estimate the main
models using pure cross-sectional analysis that tests for the (1) proportion of bypass in
the dyad from 2005-2009 as well as (2) the count of bypass tactics in the dyad over the
same period. Again, the results are very robust: the coefficient of governance quality
continues to be significant at the highest level across different model specifications and
different measures (continuous and count) of the outcome variable.24
Further, readers may request a test of my hypothesis at the recipient-year level
of analysis. To the extent that my argument suggests outcome-orientation across all
donors, monadic tests of donor bypass behavior should further strengthen confidence
in the robustness of my results. This new estimation sample incorporates 131 recipi-
ent countries. At the recipient-year level my continuous bypass variable measures the
proportion of total aid received through bypass by a recipient in a given year. Fol-
lowing the coding logic of the alternative binary bypass measure I construct a second
dependent variable that counts the number of times OECD donor countries pursue an
exclusive bypass strategy in a recipient in a given year.25 Table 3 presents the results.
Using OLS to estimate the proportion of bypass I show that the quality of governance
continues to be a crucial factor that drives donor decision-making. While the first
column captures results from the broad governance measure (as specified in the dyadic
analyses), the second column focuses on the effect of economic institutions on bypass,
controlling for important confounders. The results are consistent: the proportion of
bypass (out of total aid flows) increases as the quality of governance decreases. I then
use Poisson regression to estimate the count models in the third and fourth columns
of Table 3. As expected, I find that recipient countries are more likely to experience a
greater number of donor bypass tactics as governance quality decreases.
[Table 3]
Finally, readers might be concerned about selection effects, since the group of coun-
tries for which donors choose to bypass government institutions is not randomly selected
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but a function of earlier self-selection. To model the interdependence between these
two decisions, I employ a Heckman sample selection model (Heckman 1979). My em-
pirical model of the aid recipient selection stage includes Governance Quality as well
as the set of confounders used in estimations of bypass behavior based on the under-
standing that these covariates all affect donor decisions whether to give aid in the first
place. However, the selection stage also includes an instrumental variable that allows
the estimator to uniquely identify both stages. In the present case the identification
question asks: what factor influences donor decisions to give aid but is unrelated to
their decision to bypass? I exploit donor wealth, as measured in GDP, as an instrument
that satisfies the exclusion restriction theoretically. My logic is that the size of donor
economies affects donor decisions to provide funds but is not causally related to donor
decisions to bypass recipient governments.26 Controlling for prior selection effects, the
quality of governance remains a robust predictor of bypass: as the quality of governance
decreases, donors increase the proportion of bypass aid. To the extent that aid cap-
ture is a problem for effective aid implementation in the aid-receiving country, donors
systematically condition aid on the quality of a recipient’s economic institutions.
Implications and Conclusion
My empirical findings are congruent with my account of donor decision-making.
OECD donors allocate aid with an eye towards effective aid implementation: they
are more likely to bypass governments in countries where the risk of aid capture is
high and government-mediated aid is likely to fail due to poor state institutions. This
argument contributes to the literature by showing that donors have allocation tactics
other than government-to-government aid to pursue their goals, and the empirical
evidence demonstrates that bypass tactics are systematically employed to increase the
prospect of aid success in the recipient country.
These findings, of course, beg important questions related to donor decisions to
delegate development cooperation to non-state actors. In establishing the relationship
between recipient governance and donor decisions to bypass, I have ignored interesting
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variation across non-state development actors as well as within non-state actor types.
Some of the actors are non-profit (e.g. NGOs and multilateral organizations), whereas
others are for-profit. Do donors respond similarly when faced with not-for-profit or pri-
vate sector entities? Or, responding to variation within third actor types such as e.g.
the NGO type, where some NGOs are distinctly political, whereas others exclusively
focus on service delivery. Do donors treat these two NGO types differently? While I
choose to treat the multitude of non-state actors as one type (i.e. an alternative to
government-to-government aid), assuming that they all operate under similar prefer-
ences and strategies, I have not delved into the roles these different types actors could
play in influencing donor decision-making about aid delivery channels. This is an area
ripe for further inquiry.
While the empirical evidence presented above enhances our insights into a donor
decision calculus that derives utility from development, this research also carries im-
plications for the study of aid effectiveness. The conventional aid effectiveness frame-
work focuses on what happens to the aid in the recipient country, making aid success
dependent on governance and cooperation by the recipient government. If, however
donors systematically resort to aid delivery tools that increase the likelihood of the
aid reaching the intended beneficiaries, then research may overestimate the influence
of recipient country characteristics on the success of aid, and consequently underesti-
mate donor ability to enforce development contract. Naturally, the question becomes
whether the donor calculus indeed pays off for the poor: does delegating bilateral assis-
tance to non-state development actors really help donors overcome the implementation
hurdles inherent in government-to-government transactions? Does donor selectivity in
aid delivery help the poor? Recent work by Bearce and Tirone (2010) stresses the
importance of donor motivations for the study of aid effectiveness by showing that
aid, when primarily allocated for non-developmental purposes (as during the Cold
War), is largely ineffective at promoting economic growth. As donors become more
development-oriented (as in post-Cold War) they are more effective at enforcing the
aid contract in the aid receiving country. This study offers an important stepping stone
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for expanding this important line of inquiry by explaining the selection mechanism with
regards to aid delivery tactics.
Finally, from a policy perspective, bypassing state structures may offer immedi-
ate relief for the poor but bypass is also a double-edged sword. It might hamper
or even undermine long-term efforts to build-up a state capable of managing its own
development.27 Underlying this donor dilemma are differences in the nature of short-
and long-term development assistance. Donors often fund countries where there is need
for short-term relief and development. The question of “how many lives can be saved
right now” might get answers that are difficult to reconcile with strategies related to
long-term development. Should development assistance focus on providing antiviral
drugs to people infected with HIV/AIDS or should they invest in setting up health
care systems in a sustainable way? Donors often offer a combination of short- and
long-term approaches in countries where capacity building is possible. If it is not, then
bypassing government might be the only option.
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Notes
1. Author’s interview with senior French government official, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Paris, July 16, 2009.
2. To further illustrate the problem associated with this assumption I offer a break-
down of US aid by delivery channels across a small sample of US aid recipients
in Figure A1 in the Appendix.
3. While the Millennium Development Goals primarily have a socio-economic
thrust donor rhetoric frequently stress the inter-linkage between development and
security in the development of poor and fragile states, suggesting that poverty
alleviation has positive externalities in the security realm.
4. I define aid capture broadly as resulting from the mismanagement of aid in
the recipient, either by intentional diversion of aid through corrupt authori-
ties/bureaucrats or the waste of aid due to a lack of absorptive capacity. This
definition differs from Svensson’s (2000) and Winters (2010b) who define aid
capture as acts of corruption.
5. What is more, others argue that government-to-government aid can increase
corruption in the recipient country and incur long-term costs on the quality of
state institutions (Bates 2001; Knack 2001; Remmer 2004; Weinstein 2005).
6. The exception here are aid donations to civil society actors in the name of
democracy promotion.
7. Multiple interviews with senior donor officials documented keen awareness and
utilization of governance ratings, such as e.g. the World Bank’s Governance
Matters Project.
8. Author’s interview with senior British government official, Washington D.C.,
June 9, 2009.
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9. In some instances, a recipient government receives budgetary support or pro-
grammatic aid from a donor government and is fully responsible for the implemen-
tation process. In other instances, donor governments directly engage recipient
authorities by delivering aid projects or providing them with consulting services.
10. According to evidence reported in Barr, Fafchamps and Owens (2005) local
NGOs in Uganda are often quite young with limited expertise in delivering the
kind of services that donors are interested in. What is more, local NGOs may also
engage in corrupt behavior. As Barr et al (2005) find, many NGOs in Uganda do
not file tax returns and are subject to little or no government scrutiny regarding
the distribution of profits.
11. While the temporal domain is limited because of data availability, the years
under study allow us to analyze current donor allocation behavior and policy.
12. I offer a more fine-grainded breakdown of bypass tactics in Table A2 in the
Appendix, where I show the distribution of bypass aid for the major categories
of non-state aid across all donors which bypass recipient governments with more
than 30 percent of their aid.
13. The level of underreporting varies across time and donor. Germany, for in-
stance, exhaustively reports all its aid activities across channels of delivery since
adopting the C++ format in 2005. The United States reports across channels
since 2004 but its reporting on the channel of delivery category nears comple-
tion only in 2007. Canada, on the other hand, only provides complete channel
information in 2008.
14. To get a sense of the volume of reporting, note that in 2008 the United States
provided its bilateral foreign aid in 15,510 individual aid transactions using more
than seven different implementing agencies (including but not limited to US-
AID, the Millenium Challenge Corporation, U.S. departments of State, Defense,
Agriculture, Interior, and Energy).
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15. To illustrate the feasibility of this method, consider the following hypothetical
example: suppose a donor allocates US$ 20 million to a recipient in 2009. Based
on donor reports we know that 40 percent (or eight million US$) was provided as
government-to-government aid and 45 percent (or nine million US$) was provided
as non-state aid. 15 percent of the aid is unobserved, not accounted for by channel
of delivery. At a minimum, we know that the recipient will not receive less than
nine million dollars in aid through non-state channels or eight million dollars in
aid through state-channels. The observed shares thus contain some information
about latent values, suggesting that the partially observed channel shares would
be (equal to previous levels or) strictly increasing. Similarly, we know that the
recipient country’s government will never receive more than (or equal to) US$ 12
million from the donor, as the observed non-state channel share places an upper
bound for how much government-to-government aid could change. The program
written for the imputation in R is available from the author upon request.
16. The project offers data for six governance dimensions: voice and accountability,
regulatory quality, government effectiveness, rule of law, corruption control, and
political stability and violence.
17. In over half of the author’s interviews with donor elites, officials across US,
British, German, and French donor governments specifically mentioned World
Bank governance data as informing their assessments. Table A1 in the Appendix
includes the full list of interviews as conducted by the author.
18. I exclude political stability and violence because I include variables for civil con-
flict (PRIO) and terrorism (GTD) in my multivariate tests. Further, I exclude
political institutions from the governance indicator since donors are generally
reluctant to associate governance with democracy. Rather they explicitly dis-
tinguish between good governance and good government. I therefore include a
Freedom House democracy measure as a control in the multivariate tests.
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19. I also run the models using the Polity2 measure of democracy. The findings are
qualitatively similar. I opt for Freedom House because of greater country-year
coverage.
20. The regional categories are Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Middle East,
and Asia. The omitted regional category is Central and Eastern Europe.
21. Honaker and Linzer (2006) provide an excellent discussion about this type of
data. I subsequently draw on their notation style.
22. I provide descriptive statistics of the variables used in Models 2 and 3 in Table
A2 in the Appendix.
23. Figure A3 in the Appendix provides a histogram of Governance, Ec. Inst.
24. The results are presented in Table A3 in the Appendix.
25. I offer descriptive statistics of the variables in Table A4 in the Appendix.
26. One potential criticism of this particular instrument might be that the largest
economies are more embedded in the global economy, with a motivation to
strengthen their global economic positions. Such dynamics might systematically
bias aid delivery in favor of government-to-government aid. Obvious candidate
donors for which the exclusion restriction might be violated are the United States,
Japan, United Kingdom, Germany, and France. However, my model specifica-
tions already control for donors’ economic motives through the Trade Intensity
variable. To further address potential skepticism I estimated two separate selec-
tion models for which I present the results in Table A5 of the Appendix. Model
5A is estimated on the basis of the full sample, while Model 6A excludes the five
major economies from the analysis.
27. In 2010, the United States government announced a shift in their aid policy in
Haiti. To improve the prospect of sustainable development, the U.S. government
announced a move away from government bypass and towards state-to-state assis-
tance. As Cheryl Mills, Clinton’s chief of staff suggests: “We are now completely
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focused on how to build the capacity of the Haitian government effectively, to
improve Haiti’s long-term developmental prospects. That is something everyone
has recognized as being one of the failures of aid in the past.” Quote in “In U.S.
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Table 1: Proportion of Aid Channeled Through Non-State Actors by OECD DAC Donors
2008
Donor Proportion of non-state aid Donor Proportion of non-state aid
Sweden 0.73 Australia 0.37
Finland 0.68 United States 0.34
Spain 0.68 Denmark 0.30
Norway 0.63 Belgium 0.29
Netherlands 0.61 United Kingdom 0.27
Canada 0.61 Austria 0.15
Ireland 0.59 Germany 0.10
Switzerland 0.58 Japan 0.08
New Zealand 0.50 Greece 0.07
Luxembourg 0.49 France 0.02
Italy 0.43 Portugal 0.01
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Table 2: Explaining Bypass To Aid-Receiving Countries, 2005-2009
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
OLS OLS OLS Probit OLS (MI)
Governance, All Inst. -1.902**
(0.23)
Governance, Ec. Inst -1.578** -1.682** -0.127** -1.232**
(0.19) (0.29) (0.04) (0.17)
Freedom House -0.117+ -0.097 -0.064** -0.071
(0.07) (0.09) (0.02) (0.07)
Civil Conflict 0.437** 0.483** 0.003 0.321+
(0.11) (0.14) (0.03) (0.23)
Natural Disaster 0.023 0.036 0.046 -0.119** 0.040
(0.08) (0.06) (0.09) (0.01) (0.07)
Distance 0.870** 0.830** 0.850** 0.410** 0.753**
(0.20) (0.14) (0.18) (0.04) (0.13)
Former Colony 0.247 0.209 0.353 0.044 0.267
(0.30) (0.18) (0.28) (0.04) (0.45)
Trade Intensity -0.182* -0.184** -0.166* -0.030* -0.160*
(0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.01) (0.08)
Security Council -0.597 -0.551 -0.332 -0.079 -0.014
(0.41) (0.36) (0.33) (0.09) (0.42)
Terrorism -0.001 -0.001+ -0.000 -0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Donor Welfare -0.902** -0.903** -0.909** -0.026 -0.06**
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.02) (0.02)
Donor Growth -0.515** -0.517** -0.616** -0.064** -0.230**
(0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.02) (0.07)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.349 0.359 -0.268 0.263** 0.102
(0.35) (0.34) (0.35) (0.05) (0.21)
Latin America 0.184 0.254 -0.411 0.273** 0.132
(0.42) (0.40) (0.38) (0.07) (0.27)
Asia Pacific -0.748+ -0.878* -1.434** -0.044 -0.327+
(0.38) (0.37) (0.34) (0.07) (0.25)
Middle East -0.666 -0.513 -1.103+ 0.292** -0.240
(0.62) (0.46) (0.57) (0.09) (0.33)
Constant 153.144 159.163 817.486**
(195.09) (227.50) (171.62)
R2 0.33 0.33 0.33
chi2 2793.401
N 6728 6728 8142 8142 8142
+p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
Donor dummies and time trend included but not reported
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Table 3: Explaining the Prevalence of Bypass Aid in Aid-Receiving Countries, 2006-2009
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
OLS OLS Poisson Poisson
Governance, All Inst. -1.059** -0.462**
(0.16) (0.07)




Civil Conflict 0.270 0.057
(0.19) (0.04)
Natural Disasters 0.119+ 0.116+ 0.005 0.034
(0.06) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03)
Former Colony -0.264 -0.274 0.189+ 0.215*
(0.17) (0.17) (0.10) (0.11)
Trade Intensity -0.130** -0.101+ 0.003 -0.010
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
Security Council -0.158 -0.177 -0.115 -0.059
(0.32) (0.32) (0.16) (0.16)
Terrorism -0.002* -0.000
(0.00) (0.00)
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.484* -0.488* -0.130+ -0.140+
(0.24) (0.24) (0.08) (0.08)
Latin America -0.525+ -0.561+ -0.155 -0.077
(0.31) (0.32) (0.11) (0.11)
Asia Pacific -0.368+ -0.420* -0.524** -0.545**
(0.20) (0.19) (0.11) (0.11)
Middle East -1.279** -1.094** -0.572** -0.655**
(0.40) (0.40) (0.21) (0.21)
Constant 2.450** 2.257** 1.787** 1.736**
(0.54) (0.67) (0.24) (0.33)
R2 0.27 0.27
chi2 118.31 148.32
N 527 527 527 527
+p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
Donor dummies and time trend included but not reported
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Figure 2: Expected Values of Bypass Across Quality of Governance
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